Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Mining Deal Before Naadam

There was a committee meeting in parliament today to discuss issues surrounding whether to sign the stability agreement with Ivanhoe Mines. This appears to be the first public movement on the issue since rumors began circulating that an agreement might be reached before Naadam. Admittedly my Mongolian ability is not superb, but based on a few articles I have seen it looks like the editors of some news organizations are not particularly pleased with this rumor.

See here: УИХ Оюутолгойн гэрээний төслийг ямар ч байсан хэлэлцэхээр боллоо
And, here: Оюутолгойн гэрээг наадмаас ємнє батлахаар шуурхайлж байна

The tagline for the second article is rather telling. Let's see if I can interpret it with some accuracy. It is: Аливаа томоохон шийдвэрийг олон нийтийн анхаарал єєр тийшээ хандсан vед хулгайгаар хийдэг нь улстєрчдийн гэм биш зан болсон зvйл.

Interpretation: It is a case of politicians' predilection to take all serious decisions by theft when society is looking the other way.

Not a resounding endorsement of the decision to finalize things quickly. But, at the same time this is not surprising. It is a highly political issue. The fact the rumor is receiving a somewhat official airing in the media, though, may indicate that a deal is not only close but robust enough for everyone to feel it can be discussed freely. Maybe the hope is this gives the illusion of debate, even if cursory in nature, so as to allow the deflection of criticism post-signing. A plausible way to rush a decision is to catch someone off guard, pausing just long enough to suggest an opening to give comment, only to move quickly to resolution. In retrospect you can claim there was an opportunity to speak and the other person didn't take the opportunity, so the person has no right to complain. Can you do that with a multi-billion dollar mining deal and a whole society? As always, only time will tell.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

The Bloody White Baron

Freiherr Roman Nikolai Maximilian von Ungern-Sternberg's name was as bizarre and tortuous as his life story. James Palmer retells the story of the "Mad Baron" Ungern-Sternberg, whose military career culminated in 1921 with a brief period of tyrannical rule over Khuree (Ulaanbaatar) and the surrounding countryside, in a recently published book called "The Bloody White Baron: The Extraordinary Story of the Russian Nobleman Who Became the Last Khan of Mongolia."

The Mad Baron is one of those historical personalities that at first blush makes you think you have encountered a piece of fiction. Surely it can't be true? I would have heard about this before. It is so bizarre. At least, that is how I reacted the first time I heard about the Mad Baron a few years ago. Once the story sunk in, though, it seemed less improbable relative to the many twists and turns in Mongolia's history, especially during the 20th century. And yet, it's still a pretty fantastical story.

James Palmer goes to great lengths to chronicle the Baron's early career and the events leading up to his invasion of Mongolia in 1919. The Baron truly lived up to his many nicknames which implied an insane and/or sadistic personality, and the book is full of rather gruesome tales of Ungern-Sternberg and his officers dispatching of people in very inhumane ways. The stories are the type that are difficult to read and comprehend but also difficult to turn away from. The atrocities he and his men committed were so extreme that they almost take on a sense of fictional violence like in a horror film. Freddy Kruger and Jason are fictional characters with no "based on a true story" attached to them, though, so these stories amplify the lore and legend of Ungern-Sternberg being more (less?) than human, possibly the personification of evil.

The book is an interesting read, and Palmer does a good job of telling the story. His descriptions of Mongolia at times tack towards inaccurate and superficial, but the Baron is the star of this story, so these minor issues are easy to overlook. It's also not clear at times what the sources of information in the narrative are. Citations often seem randomly distributed. He draws upon several primary sources from archives, but he also refers to "Beast, Men, and Gods" by Ferdinand Ossendowski often in the narrative as a secondary source. As a non-expert on the issue, it is not possible for me to assess whether this is a problem for the validity of the story as Palmer has written it. However, I was left at many points in the book in which a "fact" about the Baron was presented without a citation wondering: "How could he possibly know that without a supporting document or eyewitness account?" I don't usually like it when people nitpick details like that, especially for a non-academic book meant for a popular audience, but in this case, since there are not many other accounts of Ungern-Sternberg's life, this book is likely to be used in the future to educate many people about this story in history. It would be nice to know for sure if the "facts" can be accounted for. Nevertheless, it is worth a read if one has an interest in this truly bizarre figure in Mongolia's history.

The book is available in the ACMS library.

Friday, July 3, 2009

Rumor Mill at Full Production Levels

The international press and local rumor mill are at full production levels regarding the Oyu Tolgoi stability agreement between Ivanhoe Mines, Rio Tinto, and the Mongolian government. Conclusion of the agreement is apparently imminent according to some sources. See the following article for an example:

Talk is that Ivanhoe may win approval in Mongolia

The skeptical among us have pointed out that this sort of statement of imminent signing has been in the press numerous times before with the depressing result of more of the same. A scholar at the center pointed out that at about the same time the rumors began circulating, Rio Tinto made some financial transactions which strengthened confidence in both Ivanhoe's and Rio's ability to finance a deal if it is signed. This drove share prices up for Ivanhoe before the imminent signing rumors began leaking into the press, possibly creating a confounding element in people's appraisal of the situation. See the following article for an example:

Ivanhoe Soars After Rio Sells Shares to Repay Debt

The final twist is that most of this news has not made its way into the local media. This is indeed very interesting, because it raises some interesting possibilities. Is it because the rumors are false? No need to report on something that is patently untrue and counterproductive? If this is the case, then the local media has suddenly turned a new leaf. It would be so unlike them to show such a disciplined level of journalistic integrity. (Yes, I am a cynic with regards to the local media).

Another possibility is that a deal is nearing but it is extremely fragile. So fragile, in fact, that everyone involved would like to keep it quiet from local agitators until it is either pushed through or gains enough strength to stand against a potential tide of opposition. But at the same time, in order to strengthen bargaining positions, one or both sides are leaking information to international interests to create momentum behind the deal. I am inclined to believe this possibility is in play at the moment. A deal is ready to go, but it is not robust enough yet to get a full public airing. Are members of parliament living by the old adage that it is better to ask for forgiveness than for permission? It may be so, and it may be the best strategy given the incendiary nature of the issue for some vocal oppositional factions. With some poll estimates showing that over 80% of the public would like to see an agreement signed, though, it may not be all that bad of a political strategy in the long run.

In the end, time will tell if it is for real or just more of the same.

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

Post-Election Riot One Year On

Things have been so hectic at the center lately that July 1 came and went without me taking notice of any events to remember the post-election riot last summer. I've seen a few articles in the newspaper examining the effect of the riot on the political landscape in Mongolia over the last year, but I missed the official or unofficial events organized to mark the day. A straw hat poll of different people around the office and at a reception Thursday evening indicated that I didn't miss much. Surprising, really, that someone didn't organize an ceremony to mark the day. That said, I don't sense a top-down conspiracy to suppress the memory of July 1, 2008 but rather a collective desire to let bad things remain in the past.

This was driven home by a colleague who said, "It wasn't that big of a deal." I definitely disagreed, and I reminded him that the mood in the city last summer was one that was decidedly dark; that is, until Tuvshinbayar won Mongolia's first gold medal in the Olympics. That moment was a moment of redemption, which was typified by the scene on the steps of parliament when political enemies Prime Minister Bayar (MPRP) and then MP Elbegdorj (DP) stood hand-in-hand above their heads intoxicated letting loose primal screams to the crowd in the square. Clearly the city and the country was in need of a catharsis. It was a big deal--the riot. The collective amnesia in this regard is something I find understandable and yet puzzling at the same time.

It is understandable, because leaving the past in the past is a desire most of us have when bad things happen. What is puzzling is that there doesn't seem to be a politician or a political group that feels the exact opposite. I have heard that families of the victims killed the evening of July 1 are petitioning to have a memorial erected in the park in front of the old MPRP building, possibly on the very spot Lenin's statue currently stands. But, this apparently has not gained momentum or a broad base of support. In a purportedly polarized political system, though, it is baffling, in a sense, that political leaders have not taken this issue up as political bludgeon against rivals. The event has enough fodder for both sides to use to their advantage. Repressive government, out of control opposition, failed social elite, you name it, and that evening has a political hook for your position. The lack of such political maneuvering, however, may lend credence to the hypothesis that Elbegdorj's presidential victory retroactively legitimized the parliamentary elections and therefore fully delegitimized the basis of the riot, making it become in the minds of most people what it probably always was--an act of political bravado and bluff that spun widely out of the control of the organizers. If this is true, it makes sense politically why people would choose to forget. It is a minefield of an issue that really holds no value to anyone with political ambitions.

In the end, the epilogue written for the July 1 riot may not be all that impressive or interesting. That in itself is interesting, though, because when one thinks back at that night in an honest way it really looked like things were falling apart.

Ulaanbaatar Heritage

An intern working for us this summer has made an interesting website discovery. Well, it is a discovery like Columbus discovered America. He was scooped by Chris Kaplonski who has a link to the website on his own website, and, of course, the people who made the website knew about it. Nonetheless, it is a nice find.

A Japanese anthropologist, according to Chris Kaplonski, in collaboration with Mongolian counterparts, developed a survey of Ulaanbaatar architectural heritage. Dozens of buildings and other structures in Ulaanbaatar have basic metadata entries, pictures, and maps of their locations. The metadata entries cover the basic stats and history of the buildings. It's a neat site, and I am trying to think of ways to raise awareness about it. This blog entry is one way. Maybe someone will see it and have a burning desire to add to it, too. It definitely needs work, but nevertheless it is a good first start.

The site is at: http://ulaanbaatar.m-heritage.org.

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Mongolia Profile on Al Jazeera

Al Jazeera did a recent profile piece on Mongolia. It is fairly interesting given the depth of the report, and the new president got some hard questions from the interviewer. Both parts are below.

The freeze frame has two of Mongolia's "Top 50 Most Important People" according to a fun book in the ACMS library. Sumati in the top screen is the director of the Sant Maral Foundation whose survey data I have referred to in other posts. And, President Elbegdorj needs no introduction in the bottom screen.



Saturday, June 20, 2009

Simple Propositions about Complex Circumstances

In President Elbegdorj's inaugural address in the great hall of the parliament building he emphasized the historic importance of this year's presidential election, laying out in stark terms the challenges facing the nation. Poverty, corruption, indolent and incompetent leadership, monumental choices regarding Mongolia's untapped wealth, and other issues to make the most idealistic wither at the thought of trying to solve them. Echoing a bit of President Obama, he called on all citizens to work together in the common cause to overcome these challenges, as his presidency will need their support to achieve a new future for Mongolia.

The idea of a new future for Mongolia has gotten me thinking about the fact that the public discourse surrounding politics in the country has a tendency to devolve into simple propositions about complex circumstances. Predicting Mongolia's future is a game that everyone participates in, yet the level of play never seems to rise above the amateurish. Things are often painted in stark, polarizing ways that lack the full nuance of the situations, with the ultimate unfolding of reality diverging almost routinely from the commentary and analysis provided by the social and political elite. Both Mongolians and foreign observers are guilty of doing this, taking a complex web of political and social interests and distilling it down to one or two simplistic notions nearly devoid of context or predicated on flimsy historical facts. A happened because of corruption. B is occurring because of the inertial effects of the "Communist mentality." C is the manifestation of neo-Putinism. D is just Mongolia for you. These sorts of ideas are thrown around so often without critical analysis, I think we all get sucked into believing, probably out of habit and expediency, that analyzing complex political issues in this way is not only acceptable for Mongolia but most effective.

It, of course, is not effective, because the vast majority of us remain unable to predict with any sort of accuracy how political situations will ultimately be resolved. Complex issues like the mining agreements, for example, remain mysteries, and I perceive this to be the case for everyone, from the streets to the Prime Minister's office, with the degree of the mystery only varying marginally with the level of one's own access to primary sources of information. The discourse and analysis does not match the complexity of the situation, and it inevitably fails the test of time.

I came across a passage written by Owen Lattimore in "Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia" that is not exactly a perfect fit to what I am describing but nonetheless it draws a sufficient analogy to the kind of discourse that predominates when analyzing Mongolia's present and future:

Revolutionaries tend to make history too simple. They burn with a fire in which they try to sear away the infinite complexities of individual character and the infinite multiplicities of social variation, so that they can confront the absolutely bad with the absolutely good. But revolution is not in fact a melodrama of the "good" against the "bad." It is the most tragic form of history, in which good men often make bad decisions not for evil reasons but for reasons of human weakness that may range from ignorance, or partial knowledge (which is often more treacherous than ignorance) [emphasis added] to such things as a mere hesitancy in making up their minds which, in less urgent times, would not matter much either to them or to their fellows. By the same token, revolution is also a phase of history in which the irony is often supplied by the "good" decisions made by "bad" men. (pg. 32-33)

In the passage he is speaking to the multifaceted circumstances that befell Mongolia roughly 1900-1940s where Mongolia faced historic and monumental decisions regarding its social and economic system and, of course, of utmost importance even today, about its sovereignty. But, it is also a good working analogy for the conventional framework used to produce propositions about Mongolia and the direction it is heading. The problems are more complex than dichotomies of good vs. bad, socialism vs. capitalism, democracy vs. autocracy, and yet the vast majority of commentary wholeheartedly embraces this framework.

There is nothing wrong with a political leader such as President Elbegdorj using simple propositions to make more profound statements, but I sometimes wonder if we are all not doing ourselves a disservice by not demanding more of the leaders of Mongolia and ourselves in terms of examining the circumstances more critically for, as Lattimore writes, the "infinite complexities of individual character and the infinite multiplicities of social variation." As Mongolia's exposure to complex geo-political circumstances, especially in the mining sector, continues to grow, a great deal of the success or failure of the decisions made will rest on whether they were made out of ignorance, partial information, or genuine and effective analysis. At this point, however, the current state of affairs indicate to me that the road ahead to a new future for Mongolia is still one cloaked in fog.